mirror of
https://github.com/uutils/coreutils.git
synced 2026-05-06 07:26:38 -04:00
ef5d752282
In `-P` / no-dereference mode, cp now opens the source file with `O_NOFOLLOW`, matching GNU cp. This closes a TOCTOU window where an attacker who can swap the source path between cp's `lstat` check and the subsequent open could redirect the read through a symlink to a sensitive file (e.g. /etc/shadow). With `O_NOFOLLOW` the open fails with `ELOOP` instead. The same flag is propagated to `safe_copy::create_dest_restrictive`, so the destination open also refuses to follow a symlink in no-dereference mode. Without that, an attacker who plants the dest path as a symlink between the caller's check and the open could redirect the truncate (and the subsequent write) to any file the caller has permission to write — the symmetric attack to the source side. With `nofollow=true` the dest open returns `ELOOP` and the victim file is left untouched. `copy_on_write` gains a `nofollow` parameter threaded from `copy_helper`, set to `!options.dereference(source_in_command_line)`. In deref mode the flag is false and behavior is unchanged — cp still follows symlinks, matching GNU. Extends `util/check-safe-traversal.sh` with a cp -P strace check so the invariant is locked in: future changes that drop `O_NOFOLLOW` here will fail the smoke test.
294 lines
12 KiB
Bash
Executable File
294 lines
12 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/bash
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#
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# Check that utilities are using safe traversal (openat family syscalls)
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# to prevent TOCTOU race conditions
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#
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set -e
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: ${PROFILE:=release-small}
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export PROFILE
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SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
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TEMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
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# Function to exit immediately on error
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fail_immediately() {
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echo "❌ FAILED: $1"
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echo ""
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echo "Debug information available in: $TEMP_DIR/strace_*.log"
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exit 1
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}
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cleanup() {
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rm -rf "$TEMP_DIR"
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}
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trap cleanup EXIT
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echo "=== Safe Traversal Verification ==="
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# Assume binaries are already built (for CI usage)
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# Prefer individual binaries for more accurate testing
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if [ -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/target/${PROFILE}/rm" ]; then
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echo "Using individual binaries"
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USE_MULTICALL=0
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elif [ -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/target/${PROFILE}/coreutils" ]; then
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echo "Using multicall binary"
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USE_MULTICALL=1
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COREUTILS_BIN="$PROJECT_ROOT/target/${PROFILE}/coreutils"
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else
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echo "Error: No binaries found. Please build first with 'cargo build --profile=${PROFILE}'"
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exit 1
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fi
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cd "$TEMP_DIR"
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# Create test directory structure
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mkdir -p test_dir/sub1/sub2/sub3
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echo "test1" > test_dir/file1.txt
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echo "test2" > test_dir/sub1/file2.txt
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echo "test3" > test_dir/sub1/sub2/file3.txt
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echo "test4" > test_dir/sub1/sub2/sub3/file4.txt
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check_utility() {
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local util="$1"
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local trace_syscalls="$2"
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local expected_syscalls="$3"
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local test_args="$4"
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local test_name="$5"
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echo ""
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echo "Testing $util ($test_name)..."
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local strace_log="strace_${util}_${test_name}.log"
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# Choose binary to use
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if [ "$USE_MULTICALL" -eq 1 ]; then
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local util_cmd="$COREUTILS_BIN $util"
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else
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local util_path="$PROJECT_ROOT/target/${PROFILE}/$util"
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if [ ! -f "$util_path" ]; then
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fail_immediately "$util binary not found at $util_path"
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fi
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local util_cmd="$util_path"
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fi
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# Run utility under strace
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strace -f -e trace="$trace_syscalls" -o "$strace_log" \
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$util_cmd $test_args 2>/dev/null || true
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cat $strace_log
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# Check for expected safe syscalls
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local found_safe=0
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for syscall in $expected_syscalls; do
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# fchmodat2 is the modern replacement for fchmodat on Linux 6.6+
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# Accept either as a valid safe traversal syscall
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case "$syscall" in
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fchmodat)
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if grep -qE "fchmodat2?\(" "$strace_log"; then
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echo "✓ Found fchmodat/fchmodat2() (safe traversal)"
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found_safe=$((found_safe + 1))
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else
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fail_immediately "Missing fchmodat() or fchmodat2() (safe traversal not active for $util)"
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fi
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;;
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*)
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if grep -q "$syscall" "$strace_log"; then
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echo "✓ Found $syscall() (safe traversal)"
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found_safe=$((found_safe + 1))
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else
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fail_immediately "Missing $syscall() (safe traversal not active for $util)"
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fi
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;;
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esac
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done
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# Count detailed syscall statistics
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local openat_count unlinkat_count fchmodat_count fchownat_count newfstatat_count renameat_count
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local unlink_count rmdir_count chmod_count chown_count safe_ops unsafe_ops
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openat_count=$(grep -c "openat(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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unlinkat_count=$(grep -c "unlinkat(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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fchmodat_count=$(grep -cE "fchmodat2?\(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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fchownat_count=$(grep -c "fchownat(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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newfstatat_count=$(grep -c "newfstatat(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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renameat_count=$(grep -c "renameat(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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# Count old unsafe syscalls (exclude the trace line prefix)
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unlink_count=$(grep -cE "\bunlink\(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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rmdir_count=$(grep -cE "\brmdir\(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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chmod_count=$(grep -cE "\bchmod\(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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chown_count=$(grep -cE "\b(chown|lchown)\(" "$strace_log" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n' || echo "0")
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# Ensure all variables are integers
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[ -z "$openat_count" ] && openat_count=0
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[ -z "$unlinkat_count" ] && unlinkat_count=0
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[ -z "$fchmodat_count" ] && fchmodat_count=0
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[ -z "$fchownat_count" ] && fchownat_count=0
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[ -z "$newfstatat_count" ] && newfstatat_count=0
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[ -z "$renameat_count" ] && renameat_count=0
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[ -z "$unlink_count" ] && unlink_count=0
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[ -z "$rmdir_count" ] && rmdir_count=0
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[ -z "$chmod_count" ] && chmod_count=0
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[ -z "$chown_count" ] && chown_count=0
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# Calculate totals
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safe_ops=$((openat_count + unlinkat_count + fchmodat_count + fchownat_count + newfstatat_count + renameat_count))
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unsafe_ops=$((unlink_count + rmdir_count + chmod_count + chown_count))
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echo " Strace statistics:"
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echo " Safe syscalls: openat=$openat_count unlinkat=$unlinkat_count fchmodat=$fchmodat_count fchownat=$fchownat_count newfstatat=$newfstatat_count renameat=$renameat_count"
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echo " Unsafe syscalls: unlink=$unlink_count rmdir=$rmdir_count chmod=$chmod_count chown/lchown=$chown_count"
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echo " Total: safe=$safe_ops unsafe=$unsafe_ops"
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# For rm specifically, we expect unlinkat instead of unlink/rmdir for file operations
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# Note: A single rmdir() for the root directory is acceptable because:
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# 1. The root directory path is provided by the user (not discovered during traversal)
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# 2. There's no TOCTOU race - we're not resolving paths during recursive operations
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# 3. After safe traversal removes all contents via unlinkat(), rmdir() is safe for the empty root
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if [ "$util" = "rm" ]; then
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if [ "$unlinkat_count" -gt 0 ] && [ "$unlink_count" -eq 0 ] && [ "$rmdir_count" -le 1 ]; then
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echo "✓ Using safe syscalls (unlinkat for traversal)"
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if [ "$rmdir_count" -eq 1 ]; then
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echo " Note: Single rmdir() for root directory is acceptable"
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fi
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elif [ "$unlink_count" -gt 0 ] || [ "$rmdir_count" -gt 1 ]; then
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fail_immediately "$util is UNSAFE: Using unlink/rmdir for file operations (unlink=$unlink_count rmdir=$rmdir_count unlinkat=$unlinkat_count) - vulnerable to TOCTOU attacks"
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else
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echo "⚠ No file removal operations detected"
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fi
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elif [ "$safe_ops" -gt 0 ] && [ "$unsafe_ops" -eq 0 ]; then
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echo "✓ Using only safe syscalls"
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elif [ "$safe_ops" -gt 0 ] && [ "$safe_ops" -ge "$unsafe_ops" ]; then
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echo "✓ Using primarily safe syscalls"
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elif [ "$found_safe" -gt 0 ]; then
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echo "⚠ Some safe syscalls found but mixed with unsafe ops"
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else
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fail_immediately "$util is not using safe traversal"
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fi
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}
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# Get list of available utilities
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if [ "$USE_MULTICALL" -eq 1 ]; then
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AVAILABLE_UTILS=$($COREUTILS_BIN --list)
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else
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AVAILABLE_UTILS=""
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for util in rm chmod chown chgrp du mv cp; do
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if [ -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/target/${PROFILE}/$util" ]; then
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AVAILABLE_UTILS="$AVAILABLE_UTILS $util"
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fi
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done
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fi
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# Test rm - should use openat, unlinkat, newfstatat
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if echo "$AVAILABLE_UTILS" | grep -q "rm"; then
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cp -r test_dir test_rm
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check_utility "rm" "openat,unlinkat,newfstatat,unlink,rmdir" "openat" "-rf test_rm" "recursive_remove"
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# Regression guard: rm must not issue path-based statx calls (should rely on dirfd-relative newfstatat)
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if grep -qE 'statx\(AT_FDCWD, "/' strace_rm_recursive_remove.log; then
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fail_immediately "rm is using path-based statx (absolute path); expected dirfd-relative newfstatat"
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fi
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if grep -qE 'statx\(AT_FDCWD, "[^"]*/' strace_rm_recursive_remove.log; then
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fail_immediately "rm is using path-based statx (multi-component relative path); expected dirfd-relative newfstatat"
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fi
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fi
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# Test chmod - should use openat, fchmodat, newfstatat
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if echo "$AVAILABLE_UTILS" | grep -q "chmod"; then
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cp -r test_dir test_chmod
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check_utility "chmod" "openat,fchmodat,fchmodat2,newfstatat,chmod" "openat fchmodat" "-R 755 test_chmod" "recursive_chmod"
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# Additional regression guard: ensure recursion uses dirfd-relative openat, not AT_FDCWD with a multi-component path
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if grep -q 'openat(AT_FDCWD, "test_chmod/' strace_chmod_recursive_chmod.log; then
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fail_immediately "chmod recursed using AT_FDCWD with a multi-component path; expected dirfd-relative openat"
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fi
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fi
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# Test chown - should use openat, fchownat, newfstatat
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if echo "$AVAILABLE_UTILS" | grep -q "chown"; then
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cp -r test_dir test_chown
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USER_ID=$(id -u)
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GROUP_ID=$(id -g)
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check_utility "chown" "openat,fchownat,newfstatat,chown,lchown" "openat fchownat" "-R $USER_ID:$GROUP_ID test_chown" "recursive_chown"
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fi
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# Test chgrp - should use openat, fchownat, newfstatat
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if echo "$AVAILABLE_UTILS" | grep -q "chgrp"; then
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cp -r test_dir test_chgrp
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check_utility "chgrp" "openat,fchownat,newfstatat,chown,lchown" "openat fchownat" "-R $GROUP_ID test_chgrp" "recursive_chgrp"
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fi
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# Test du - should use openat, newfstatat
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if echo "$AVAILABLE_UTILS" | grep -q "du"; then
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cp -r test_dir test_du
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check_utility "du" "openat,newfstatat,stat,lstat" "openat" "-a test_du" "directory_usage"
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fi
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# Test mv - should use openat, renameat for directory moves
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if echo "$AVAILABLE_UTILS" | grep -q "mv"; then
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mkdir -p test_mv_src/sub
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echo "test" > test_mv_src/file.txt
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echo "test" > test_mv_src/sub/file2.txt
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check_utility "mv" "openat,renameat,newfstatat,rename" "openat" "test_mv_src test_mv_dst" "move_directory"
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fi
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# cp invariant checks. Both #10011 (restrictive 0600 destination mode) and
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# #10017 (O_NOFOLLOW on the -P source) need to hold; verify each on its own
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# strace.
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if echo "$AVAILABLE_UTILS" | grep -q "cp"; then
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if [ "$USE_MULTICALL" -eq 1 ]; then
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cp_cmd="$COREUTILS_BIN cp"
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else
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cp_cmd="$PROJECT_ROOT/target/${PROFILE}/cp"
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fi
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# #10011: destination created with mode 0600 so other users cannot open
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# the file through its umask-derived initial mode before cp narrows it.
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echo "cp_perm_test" > test_cp_src_perm
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rm -f test_cp_dst_perm
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strace -f -e trace=openat -o strace_cp_dest_perm.log \
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$cp_cmd test_cp_src_perm test_cp_dst_perm 2>/dev/null || true
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if ! grep -qE 'openat\(AT_FDCWD, "test_cp_dst_perm".*O_CREAT.*, 0600\)' strace_cp_dest_perm.log; then
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cat strace_cp_dest_perm.log
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fail_immediately "cp must create the destination with mode 0600 (issue #10011)"
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fi
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echo "✓ cp creates destination with restrictive 0600 mode"
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rm -f test_cp_src_perm test_cp_dst_perm
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# #10017: -P opens source with O_NOFOLLOW so a path swap to a symlink
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# between the lstat check and the open cannot redirect the copy.
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echo "cp_nofollow_test" > test_cp_src
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strace -f -e trace=openat -o strace_cp_nofollow.log \
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$cp_cmd -P test_cp_src test_cp_dst 2>/dev/null || true
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if ! grep -qE 'openat\(AT_FDCWD, "test_cp_src".*O_NOFOLLOW' strace_cp_nofollow.log; then
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cat strace_cp_nofollow.log
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fail_immediately "cp -P must open the source with O_NOFOLLOW (issue #10017)"
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fi
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echo "✓ cp -P opens source with O_NOFOLLOW"
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rm -f test_cp_src test_cp_dst
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fi
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echo ""
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echo "✓ Basic safe traversal verification completed"
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echo ""
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echo "=== Additional Safety Checks ==="
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# Check for dangerous patterns across all logs
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echo "Checking for dangerous path resolution patterns..."
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# Check that we're not doing excessive path resolutions (sign of TOCTOU vulnerability)
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echo "Checking path resolution frequency..."
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for log in strace_*.log; do
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if [ -f "$log" ]; then
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path_resolutions=$(grep -c "test_" "$log" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
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if [ "$path_resolutions" -gt 20 ]; then
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echo "⚠ $log: High path resolution count ($path_resolutions) - potential TOCTOU risk"
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fi
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fi
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done
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echo ""
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echo "=== Summary ==="
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echo "All utilities are using safe traversal correctly!"
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